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Abstract 
Service-oriented architecture offers a promising approach for supporting interoperability and 
flexibility in the context of increasingly dynamic and rapidly changing requirements in the 
business world. However, encapsulation of business functionalities as self-contained services, 
as one of the main concepts in a SOA, brings new challenges. While business experts 
concentrate on the domain-specific aspects, other non-functional requirements such as 
security remain mostly neglected, if all understood. Costs for security administration may 
increase, business-driven security requirements may not be addressed and security 
configurations may not match at all internal and external regulations and guidelines.   Based 
on these needs, we propose a technology-independent framework that provides graphical 
concepts for incorporating the security demands, facilitating the handling of security 
requirements from the specification to their realization. 
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1 Introduction 
Business environments are undergoing a fundamental change (Friedman, 2007). The 
complexity of the value chains is dramatically increasing, spreading more and more over 
organizations and continents. To succeed in the face of fierce competition the enterprises 
have to be fast and flexible. 
Service-oriented architecture (SOA), as a new architectural style in information 
technology, has evolved to provide the required agility and flexibility. The concept of SOA 
focuses on building loosely-coupled applications made out of self-contained business 
functionality, also known as services (Weerawarana, Curbera, Leymann, Storey, & 
Ferguson, 2005).  
Typical business process languages foster the implementation of services and provide a 
suitable modeling notation for business functionality. The associated runtime semantics 
provide support for the execution order and orchestration of the included business logic, 
such as services, backend transaction calls or human interactions. The actual business 
process models, however, remain independent of the realizing functionality. In contrast, as 
business processes become more complex, analysis of the realized business logic and 
associated constraints becomes significantly harder.  
While the business expert concentrates on the specification of the business aspects of a 
process, other aspects, such as security, remain mostly neglected (if at all understood). The 
reasons for this are often lack of security knowledge on the business side as well as the 
unwillingness to “pollute” the business process with additional information perceived as 
non-business related. Security, and in a wider sense, compliance, of a business process, 
however, are critical to any organization, as for example an unauthorized modification of a 
node (which could e.g. represent a purchase order) may have major implications on the 
process outcome. 
Accordingly, the visualization of security artifacts on the business process model level 
appears to be a promising approach regarding the communication between business and 
security experts, system-independent definition of security constraints, and model-driven 
propagation through a system stack. 
In this thesis we present an approach that allows a business user to easily identify and 
specify security controls on the business process level. This approach is based on a prior 
analysis of core elements of business modeling languages common to business process 
dialects used today. Finally, in relation to these elements we identify possible matching 
types of security constraints that in turn enable the enforcement of related mechanisms at 
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runtime. A prototypical implementation is based on the motivating example that is 
introduced in the following section. 
1.1 Motivating Example 
This section presents a motivating example typically found in supply chains. In our 
scenario we analyze a basic supply chain including the involved participants, process steps, 
and data exchange. We focus on typical constraints in business process relationships and 
their implications on the technical implementation. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Motivating Example - Supply Chain Process  
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The retailer is a medium-size business that operates hundreds of grocery stores across 
several regions. The manufacturer is a typical large enterprise that has many business 
relationships with retailers. The manufacturer has its own logistics service that transports 
ordered goods to retailers. A retailer acting as a requesting party stores the goods 
temporarily before selling them to the end-consumers.  
Facing the increasing competition on the regional market, our retailer is interested in 
efficient management of all processes relevant for business. The elaborated supply chain 
process, as shown in Figure 1.1, promises to reduce the administrative costs. However, the 
retailer is concerned about the exchange of sensitive information and the expected 
overhead in managing the security relevant aspects. 
The business case involves the roles and constraints as detailed in the following Sections 
1.1.1 – 1.1.3: 
1.1.1 Retailer 
The retailer submits a purchase request. As computer generated documents without a 
signature are not legally binding for all business-to-business transactions, some purchasing 
requests may contain a separate digitally signed purchasing order copy, which has to be in 
compliance with the Commercial Code.   
Retailer Tasks: 
• Check Inventory. 
• Prepare Order. 
• Place Order. 
• Update Inventory. 
Retailer Constraints:  
• Only managers and employees from the purchasing department are allowed to 
place purchase requests.  
• The purchase request is a piece of sensible information that must be kept 
confidential by manufacturers.  
• The retailer must be able to authorize the manufacturer for placing a request to the 
rating agency. 
• An audit of all placed orders must be ensured.  
• All illegal access order placements must be prohibited and traced.  
Technical Implications: 
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• The concept of roles at least on the level of the enterprise must be available.  
• Execution of retailer tasks should require prior authentication. 
• The document resource of the “Prepare Order” must be signed with a valid 
signature. 
• The “Place an Order” task must be encrypted and require remote authorization. 
• The “Check Inventory” and “Update Inventory” tasks require a local authorization. 
• The retailer infrastructure must support logging and tracing to facilitate later audit. 
1.1.2 Manufacturer 
The manufacturer receives a purchase request. If the received order comes from an 
associated retailer, the manufacturer has to check the credit rating of the requestor. Only if 
the retailer identity is verified and the rating checks are all passed, the order is forwarded 
to the internal logistics service. Finally the order is packed and transported to the retailer.  
Manufacturer tasks: 
• Check Retailer Rating 
• Pack Order for Retailer. 
• Transport to Retailer. 
Manufacturer constraints: 
• The received order is a piece of sensitive information and must be protected from 
improper and unauthorized disclosure. 
• The received order must be correct and complete. 
• The received order must have contractual accountability. The identity associated 
with the placed order must stem from a valid retailer at the time of the request. 
• The customer must have an acceptable rating. 
• The passing of information to the rating agency is only allowed with an explicit 
permission of the retailer1
Technical implications: 
.  
• The retailer should be able to open a secure session with the manufacturer. The 
signature of the requestor must be valid. 
• The privacy of retailer data must be ensured. Only allowed attributes of the 
retailer’s business data are allowed to be forwarded to the rating agency. 
• The Check Retailer task must support impersonation2
                                                 
1 This concept is known as downstream usage control. It describes how the data should be treated after it was 
released. (Bussard, Neven, & Preiss, 2010)  
.  
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• “Pack an Order for Retailer” and “Transport to Retailer” tasks may have context-
based threats on involved resources. 
1.1.3 Rating Agency 
The Rating Agency is an organization that maintains a database of previous deficits in 
payments of the registered business partners. All registered business partners may place 
rating enquires about their business partners as long as they are in the database. 
Rating Agency Tasks: 
• Check the Validity of the Request. 
• Send Rating Information. 
Rating Agency Constraints:  
• The identity associated with the rating information request must stem from a 
registered partner of the rating agency. 
• The rating agency needs to be able to verify that the presented identity belongs to 
the associated requestor. 
• The information about the rating of the business partner is confidential and should 
be shared only on explicit permission of the examined party. 
Technical Implications: 
• Unauthorized access to the rating’s agency database must be prevented. 
• The rating agency should be able to trust the requesting identity. 
• “Check the Validity of the Request” task must support impersonation. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Business partners want services to be available when they are needed. The requested 
information must be correct and its integrity has to be assured. Furthermore, the 
interactions with the services must be transparent, allowing confidentiality, guaranteeing 
privacy of their personal information when communicating with underlying services and 
components. The orchestration of services must allow flexible access control policies for 
resources reflecting the dynamic nature of legitimated parties.  In addition, despite the 
heterogeneity of underlying platforms, the autonomy and loosely-coupled manner of 
composed services, the ubiquitous accessibility of resources must be always ensured to a 
                                                                                                                                                    
2 The concept of impersonation allows one party to transfer the right to use the own identity to another party.  
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mutually satisfying degree. However, dynamic and flexible binding of services conflict 
with conventional security mechanisms and models, making modeling and enforcing of 
security constraints a serious challenge.  
Accordingly, there still remains a need for an efficient method that can: 
• Assist the business expert by providing a unified well-understandable visualization 
of security relevant aspects; 
• Encompassing several workflow-related security mechanisms and their variations; 
• From convenient modeling up to the actual enforcement and implementation; 
• Enabling flexible and highly customizable multi-domain access control policies; 
• And reflecting the dynamic nature of legitimated parties in orchestrated scenarios. 
 
Based on these observations, the main goals of this thesis are: 
 
• An in-depth identification of security goals, related enforcing security 
requirements, and implementing security mechanisms;  
• A conceptual workflow model, access control model, and a general security 
framework with several levels of abstraction, including detailed transition matrices 
to each layer; 
• A unified visualization of the previous concepts; 
• An architecture, design, and implementation of a validating prototype based on the 
motivating example and the elaborated framework.  
1.3 Outline / Structure of the Thesis  
As shown in Figure 1.2 this thesis is divided into seven chapters: 
1. Introduction 
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Figure 1.2: Thesis Methodology 
Chapter 1 – Introduction: The introduction did provide a motivating example leading to a 
problem statement covered in this diploma thesis. Furthermore, we summarized the scope 
of our work and provide some useful definitions and conventions.  
Chapter 2 – Related Work: This chapter introduces and discusses the current state of the art 
concerning the modeling and enforcement of security in workflows. 
Chapter 3 – Fundamentals: In order to support further analysis of the problem statement 
possible, this chapter provides an overview of the main concepts and technologies covered 
in this thesis. 
Chapter 4 – Workflow Model Concept and Specification:  Based on the business modeling 
constructs discussed in Chapter 3 we present a general concept of a workflow model. The 
elaborated model elements are used as a basis for the security framework introduced in the 
next chapter. 
Chapter 5 – Security Model Concept and Specification: This chapter investigates the core 
problems in security modeling and presents a general framework for modeling security in 
business driven environments. The presented security framework encompasses four layers: 
business modeling layer, security goals layer, security requirements, and security 
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mechanisms layer. For each layer a set of suitable components is discussed. All 
combinations to the underlying layer are elaborated and summarized in transition matrices. 
The chapter closes with a discussion on how the elaborated security framework can be 
applied to the motivating example introduced in the first chapter. 
Chapter 6 – Design and Implementation: This chapter presents an overview of the 
architecture, design, and implementation details of the validating prototype that is based on 
the framework presented within the previous chapter. 
Chapter 7 – Summary and Future Work: The final chapter summarizes the achieved results 
and introduces some critical discussions on this topic. Finally, the chapter ends with the 
future work in the context of this thesis. 
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2 Related Work 
Besides available general introduction to computer security (Pfleeger, 2006), Web service 
security (Bertino, Martino, Paci, & Squicciarini, 2009), (Rosenberg & Remy, 2004), role-
based access control (Ferraiolo, Kuhn, & Chandramouli, 2007) and business process 
management (Leymann & Roller, Production workflow: Concepts and Techniques, 2000), 
(Harvey, 2005), (Weske, 2007), we decided to review the most relevant papers on 
modeling security constraints at the business process level. 
The relevant work is organized in three sections: security modeling, modeling constraints 
in workflows, and modeling roles and access control. The first section provides an 
overview of papers with a focus on security in workflows and general security modeling. 
As none of the investigated work presents a solid and integrated approach to the previously 
defined problem statement, our goals are to investigate theoretical contributions in security 
constraint modeling and the alternatives of role-based access control applicable to 
workflow management systems. 
2.1 Security Modeling 
(Jurjens, 2002) presents a formalized approach based on UML for expressing security-
relevant information within the diagrams in a system specification. The model allows 
MDA-like formal analysis and verification of security mechanisms and protocols. The 
presented approach focuses on stereotypes, tagged values and constraints of the UML 
extensions mechanisms without any systematical identification and description of the 
security goals that can be expressed with the proposed model. 
(Artelsmair, Essmayr, Lang, & Weippl, 2002) provide a comprehensive overview of 
available security modeling methodologies. Authentication as a security goal can take three 
forms: general user authentication, authentication of message content, and message origin 
authentication. Integrity as a concept to ensure consistency of data is divided into semantic 
integrity for being correct and complete and access control integrity for authorizing which 
users can modify which resources. The same applies to confidentiality, which denotes the 
protection of data from improper and unauthorized disclose. It is divided into semantic 
confidentiality and access control confidentiality. The first constraint defines different 
levels of secrecy of data, e.g. public or secret and the last specifies which users are able 
access which data. Further identified security goals are: non-repudiation which prevents an 
individual from denying having performed a particular action, auditing, anonymity for the 
absence of identity, and validity for digital contracts and signatures. After that they present 
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several security requirements that can enforce the identified security goals. The presented 
approach concentrates on UML without any systematical visualization on the introduced 
concepts and provides no information on how derived security requirements can be 
applied. 
(Herrmann & Herrmann, 2006) present workflow related security goals and study their 
possible assignment to main categories of business process elements such as agents, roles, 
artifacts, and activities. Further they present a tool which allows domain experts to define 
the inspected security requirements expressed through UML activity diagrams. Further, 
they discuss how the abstract security goals can be checked for syntactical and semantical 
correctness. However, the do not provide any description of the enforcing and realizing 
mechanisms. 
(Rodriguez, Fernandez-Medina, & Piattini, 2007) introduce graphical extensions, which 
allow the specification of auditing, integrity, access control, non-repudiation, privacy and 
attack harm detection. They also present to which Business Process Diagram (BPD) these 
security properties can be applied. The presented approach focuses only on BPMN and 
takes only graphical aspects into consideration. 
(Wolter, Menzel, Schaad, Miseldine, & Meinel, 2009) address typical security goals, such 
as authentication or confidentiality. They propose a model-driven transformation approach 
from security requirements up to concrete security implementations. They further discuss a 
translation of security annotated business processes into XACML (eXtensible Access 
Control Markup Language) and AXIS2 security configurations. However, the graphical 
notation and the prototypical implementation are limited to the Separation of Duty (SoD) 
and the Binding of Duty (BoD) constraints. The authors do not provide any explicit 
graphical notations for the rest of the security constraints. 
(Riesner & Pernul, 2010) analyze Business Process Modeling (BPM) with the focus on 
sensitive areas. After considering and comparing different sources in literature they derive 
the following security goals: integrity, availability, privacy, confidentiality, access control 
for enforcement of CIA (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) requirements, 
authentication, separation of duties for achieving compliance and as a measure to avoid 
abuse of privileges, audit, and adherence to business sequence flow. Further, they propose 
“security functions” and “security mechanisms” layers for enforcing and implementing the 
identified security goals.  However, without any formal description of the containing 
elements and transition matrices, the presented approach is of little help to our problem 
statements.  
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(Wöhrle, 2008) presents an interesting extension for applying XML-Signature and XML-
Encryption to different parts of a WS-BPEL process. The presented approach is especially 
practical in collaborative scenarios, but without focusing on related access control 
mechanisms the intended results could be very difficult to achieve. 
2.2 Modeling Constraints in Workflows 
(Bertino, Ferrari, & Atluri, 1999) divide constraints on role and assignment in workflow 
into three main categories: static, dynamic and hybrid constraints. While static constraints 
can be evaluated at design time, dynamic, as the name supposes, can be only evaluated at 
run time. Their activation depends on the execution history of the workflow. Hybrid 
constraints can be partially verified at the design time. However, they do not further 
investigate on the different types of SoD constraints. 
(Schaad, 2003) extends the role concept by constraining the role membership, role 
activation and role use. He specifies the separation controls in two main dimensions static 
separation of duties (strong exclusion) and dynamic separation of duties (weak exclusion), 
where a further distinction between several kinds of dynamic separation is made.  
(van der Aalst & Pesic, 2006) state that most business modeling languages are rather 
procedural and do not fit well with the autonomous nature of services. Thus, they propose 
a declarative language named DecSerFlow standing for Declarative Service Flow 
language, that should facilitate a better enactment and monitoring of the service flows. In 
their paper, they distinguish three groups of constraints: existence constraints, relation 
constraints and negation constraints. 
2.3 Modeling Roles and Access Control 
(Sandhu, Coyne, Feinstein, & Youman, 1996) present role-based access control (RBAC) 
model concept which is based on roles and roles hierarchies. They introduce some basic 
constraints such as: mutually exclusive roles also known as SoD constraints, cardinality 
constraints e.g. a maximum number of members in a role, and prerequisite constraints 
based on a role hierarchy e.g. the user A can be assigned to role A only if the user is 
already  assigned to a role B. 
(Oh & Park, 1999) propose a task-role based access control (T-RBAC) model that enhance 
the RBAC (Role Based Access Control) model through the integration of task and role. 
2. Related Work 
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The characteristics of tasks are the basis of access control and have a separate meaning 
from role.  
(Feng, Jun, Hao, & Li, 2004) present a context-aware access control system service-
oriented role-based access control model (CSRAC). In their model, access control can 
make its access control decisions by capturing security relevant environmental context, 
such as time, location, operation state, or other environmental information. Thus, it allows 
an access control which dynamically can grant and adapt permissions to users based on 
their current context. 
(Yuan & Tong, 2005) introduce an attribute based access control (ABAC) model, which is 
based on subject, object, and environment attributes. Further, it addresses both mandatory 
(MAC) and discretionary access control (DAC) needs. The goal of the approach is to 
completely decouple the subject-object relation by independently defining attributes of 
subjects, objects and environment state.  
(Emig, Brandt, Abeck, Biermann, & Klarl, 2007) combine the traditional role based access 
control (RBAC) approach with the ABAC model and introduce a new WSOA-aware 
access control metamodel. A problem of ABAC as the authors state is the indirection 
between objects and their access permissions. This indirection increases the complexity of 
appropriate policies. Thus, their model inherits from ABAC only the way service 
requestors are identified. The identification is based on a set of attributes and combined 
with RBAC: the role hierarchy and a set of permissions.    
(Li, Li, Xie, Chen, Liu, & Pan, 2008) present a more fine-grained multi-hierarchy and task-
role based access model named H-TRBAC.  They apply the idea of hierarchies in roles on 
the task set, creating two multi-hierarchical sets. This model allows creating constraints 
where a task cannot be scheduled until its entire ancestors are completed. 
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3 Fundamentals 
This chapter focuses on main technologies and services that are crucial for a better 
understanding of the concepts and principles discussed in the following chapters. This 
chapter is not supposed to give a complete introduction of all topics, but rather a general 
overview of the relevant topics such as security, workflow management and their related 
subtopics.   
The first section presents SOA as the implementing architectural style. The methodology 
of SOA centers on service-oriented solutions and promises besides the flexibility and 
agility in definition of services, the facilitation in incorporating of security in technology-
independent and loosely-coupled manner (Weerawarana, Curbera, Leymann, Storey, & 
Ferguson, 2005). The next section is dedicated to the main concepts and technologies in 
security. The evaluated standards are part of the implementation layer in the proposed 
security framework in Chapter 5. Finally, the Business Process Management Section gives 
the reader a synopsis of recent workflow related concepts and technologies that have been 
taken into account for the development of the conceptual workflow model introduced in 
Chapter 4. 
3.1 Service-Oriented Architecture 
Service-oriented architecture is a specific architectural style that allows exchanging data 
and participating in business processes regardless of the operating systems or programming 
languages underlying those applications (Newcomer & Lomow, 2004). The main concept 
behind SOA is the concept of services (Bertino, Martino, Paci, & Squicciarini, 2009). 
Services hide implementation details and make functionality available through 
standardized interfaces in a loosely coupled manner. Services usually provide additional 
metadata that describes such information in terms of business functionality, security 
requirements, and quality of services (QoS). Through the use of machine readable formats 
such as UDDI (Universal Description Discovery and Integration) for metadata, this 
information is discoverable by other systems. Being discoverable and available through 
public interfaces, services can be composed into new business-oriented services, allowing 
a new level of abstraction (Weerawarana, Curbera, Leymann, Storey, & Ferguson, 2005).  
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Figure 3.1: SOA-triangle (Weerawarana, Curbera, Leymann, Storey, & Ferguson, 2005) 
The SOA Triangle as shown in Figure 3.1 summarizes the SOA cycle described in the 
following. A service provider publishes its services based on the definition schema of the 
discovery facility. The discovery facility aggregates the metadata making it available for a 
requestor. After a successful search the service requestor retrieves metadata for binding 
and consuming the service.  
3.1.1 SOAP 
 
Figure 3.2: Structure of a SOAP message 
The SOA paradigm makes an exhaustive usage of messages for inter-service and inter-
vendor sharing and exchange of information. SOAP3
                                                 
3 The acronym SOAP was originally defined as Simple Object Access Protocol. Starting with the version 1.1 
the authors decided that SOAP would be no longer an acronym. (Weerawarana, Curbera, Leymann, Storey, 
& Ferguson, 2005). 
 (Gudgin, et al., 2007) is a standard 
messaging protocol standardized by W3C. SOAP defines an extensible mechanism for 
message exchange between Web services. Each SOAP message is an XML document that 
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consists of an envelope, header, and a body. The envelope is the root element of the SOAP 
message. The optional header element contains information about the metadata of the 
message and the body element contains the actual payload of the message. However, the 
extensible mechanism of the SOAP specification provides support for more sophisticated 
message exchange patterns (MEP).   
3.1.2 Web Services Definition Language (WSDL) 
The WSDL4
Figure 3.3
 v.1.1 specification (Christensen, Curbera, Meredith, & Weerawarana, 2001) is 
the service representation language used to provide a uniform mechanism for describing 
service interfaces and specific bindings that the service supports. As shown in , 
WSDL specification can be divided into two parts: an interface and an implementation 
part.  
 
Figure 3.3: WSDL v.1.1 Specification 
The interface part describes the general vendor-neutral structure of the service. It contains 
all the supported operations, its operation parameters, and the definitions or references of 
abstract data types. The data being exchanged between the service endpoints is specified as 
a part of messages. The collection of allowed operations is grouped into port types, which 
are similar to the interfaces in programming languages such as C# or Java. 
                                                 
4 The meaning of the acronym has changed in WSDL v.2.0 to Web Services Description Language. The 
version 2.0 is out of scope of this thesis due to incompatibility with WS-BPEL v.2.0. 
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The implementation part describes the bindings of abstract interface to its implementation 
details. The binding element specifies transport details for one or more interfaces. An 
endpoint associates a network address with a binding. A service groups endpoints together 
and associates it with the abstract interface. 
3.2 Security 
To protect all participants, the associated resources and their interactions in business 
process driven environments, several techniques must be considered. This section presents 
the well-known security requirements and their potential role in workflows. In addition, 
most important security mechanisms and the according standards used to enforce the 
security dimensions are introduced and briefly discussed. 
3.2.1 Security Requirements 
The three well-known security dimensions are (Bertino, Martino, Paci, & Squicciarini, 
2009): 
• Confidentiality. Confidentiality ensures that the transmitted data is protected from 
unauthorized disclosure, meaning that only authorized parties can view the 
contents.   
• Integrity. Integrity ensures that the transmitted data remain unaltered during 
transmission, meaning that only authorized parties are allowed to modify data in 
authorized ways. 
• Availability. Availability ensures that the data is delivered to intended authorized 
parties at appropriate times. 
Further, the resources must be protected against unauthorized access. To address this issue, 
the requester of a resource must be identifiable. This requirement is also known as 
authentication. The specification of who can access which resources is called 
authorization. Access control, which will be addressed in the next section, captures the 
procedures and functions that control authentication and authorization. 
3.2.2 Access Control  
The main purpose of an access control model is to specify and enforce access control 
policies and to streamline the authorization management. To provide a better 
understanding of the concept behind role-based access we define the following notions, 
which are based on  (Sandhu, Coyne, Feinstein, & Youman, 1996): 
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• User. A user generally refers to a human who interfaces with any computer system. 
A user may have multiple identities, such as a particular role or a custom attribute 
mapped to the user. These identities may be simultaneously active are matched by 
an authentication mechanism. 
• Role. A function or an attribute conferred on a user by an authority. 
• Role hierarchy. A partial order relationship among roles. 
• Session. A session is an instance of an access operation invoked by a user.  
• Subject. A process acting on behalf of a user. 
• Object. An object is any resource accessible on a computer system. 
• Operation. An operation is a process invoked by a subject. 
• Permission. A permission is an authorization of an subject to perform some 
operations on a subject.  
As reviewed papers in related work demonstrate, there exist a lot of different approaches in 
access control models. What most access control models directly or indirectly share are the 
three well-known security principles (Sandhu, Coyne, Feinstein, & Youman, 1996): 
• Least privilege: assigning only those permissions to a role required by a user to 
perform the assigned task. 
• Separation of duties: Invocation of mutual exclusive roles to perform a certain 
task. 
• Data abstraction: Instead of typical operating system read-write-execute 
permissions to provide more abstract permissions, such as credit and debit for an 
account object. 
3.2.3 Security Mechanisms 
Recent developments in Web service security allow designing and implementing security 
in business scenarios in a SOA compliant way, meaning to make the security mechanisms 
interoperable and extensible to address new requirements or new security technologies. 
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Figure 3.4: Web Services Security Specifications (Weerawarana, Curbera, Leymann, Storey, & Ferguson, 
2005) 
In order to provide a better understanding how to enforce the desired security requirements 
this section surveys the most promising existing or proposed Web service standards. 
3.2.3.1 XML Signature 
XML Signature (Bartel, Boyer, Fox, LaMaccia, & Simon, 2008) defines a standard for 
representing digital signature in a XML format. The main characteristics of the XML 
Signature standard are (Bertino, Martino, Paci, & Squicciarini, 2009): 
• Signing data items consisting of complete XML documents, parts of it or any 
arbitrary binary data; 
• Covering several resources with a single signature; 
• Supporting enveloping, enveloped, or detached packing mechanisms. An enveloped 
signature means that the signature is inside the referenced resources, where an 
enveloping signature references data inside the signature. The detached signature, 
as the name suggests, references a resource that is separate from the signature. An 
example of a structure of a detached structure is shown in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5: Detached Structure Referencing an External Resource (Rosenberg & Remy, 2004) 
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3.2.3.2 XML Encryption  
XML Encryption (Imamura, Dillaway, & Simon, 2002) specifies how to represent and to 
reference information about the encryption mechanisms such the encryption key and 
encryption algorithm or information needed by the recipient to decrypt the sent data. It 
defines a standard model for confidentiality by hiding of data from anyone other than the 
private key holder. The XML Encryption standard supports (Bertino, Martino, Paci, & 
Squicciarini, 2009): 
• Encryption of parts or complete XML documents or any arbitrary binary data; 
• Separation of encryption information and encrypted data; 
• Referencing mechanisms for addressing encryption information from encrypted 
data sections; 
• End-to-end security, meaning allowing confidentiality at the application level for 
traversing multiple intermediaries. 
3.2.3.3 The XML Key Management Specification (XKMS) 
The XML Key Management Specification (Hallam-Baker & H. Mysore, 2005) defines a 
standard for distributing and registering public keys. XKMS does not depend on any 
particular underlying PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) implementation. A common 
approach is to use it in conjunction with the previously discussed XML Signature and 
XML Encryption standards.  
 
Figure 3.6: XKMS Services (Bertino, Martino, Paci, & Squicciarini, 2009) 
 
As shown in Figure 3.6 the XRMS standard defines two services: the XML Key 
Information Services (X-KISS) and the XML Key Registration Service (X-KRSS). The X-
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KISS service specifies functionality for locating and validating of public keys. To provide 
a simple example: a client may receive a document, where a signature is identified by the 
special KeyInfo XML element and is implemented by some security mechanism such as 
X.509 (Nadalin A. , Kaler, Monzillo, & Hallam-Baker, 2006).  
Instead of resolving the key itself, the client may send it to the X-KISS service, which then 
resolves the required elements. However, the X-KISS service does not make any assertion 
concerning the validity of the binding between the data and the key. The X-KRSS service 
specification defines operations for registering, reissuing, revoking and recovering of the 
public keys. The register operation may bind additional information to the public key, such 
as name, identifier, or any further attributes defined by the implementation. Reissuing and 
revoking operations allow accordingly the registered keys to be reissued or to be revoked. 
The last operation allows recovering a key by providing information that allows 
authenticating the request to the X-KRSS service (Nordbotten, 2009). 
3.2.3.4 WS-Security 
WS-Security (Nadalin A. , Kaler, Monzillo, & Hallam-Baker, 2006) is a framework that 
defines end-to-end integrity and confidentiality for SOAP messages.  
The framework makes use of the XML Encryption standard to provide confidentiality, and 
the XML Signature standard to enabling the message integrity. By defining the security-
related information in the header of a SOAP message, the specification allows to sign 
and/or to encrypt SOAP message body elements, header blocks, or any combinations of 
them. The standard does not rely on any concrete security algorithms and allows using 
multiple signature formants, and multiple encryption technologies (Bertino, Martino, Paci, 
& Squicciarini, 2009). 
Finally, WS-Security specifies a mechanism to include security tokens within SOAP 
messages. A security token represents a set of declarations (also known as assertions or 
claims) that are asserted by an authority and contain some security relevant information, 
such as a name, a key, or a privilege.  WS-Security is neutral in relation to the security 
token formats and it can be extended to support any new security tokens. Currently five 
token types are supported in separate security profiles (Nordbotten, 2009): 
• The UsernameToken Profile. The UsernameToken profile can be used to identify a 
requester by username. A password of the shared secret can be also provided. 
Further, the profile specifies a way to derive the shared key with a given username.  
• The X.509 Certificate Token Profile. The X.509 Certificate Token Profile defines 
how to include X.509 certificates into a SOAP message. A X.509 certificate can be 
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used for authentication. The sender can be proved by signing the content using the 
corresponding private key. 
• The Kerberos Token Profile. The Kerberos token profile defines how Kerberos 
tickets within security tokens can be applied to SOAP messages. Kerberos 
(Buckley, Hardjono, Yu, Hudson, R., & Tsitkova) is an authentication protocol that 
was developed by MIT to provide strong authentication by using secret-key 
cryptography. 
• The Rights Expression Language (REL) Token Profile. The REL Token Profile 
defines how to include Rights Expressions expressed in XML Rights Management 
Language (XrML). 
• The SAML Token Profile. The SAML token profile defines how to include SAML 
assertions in SOAP messages. SAML is discussed in more detail in the next 
section. 
3.2.3.5 Security Assertions Markup Language (SAML) 
The Security Assertion Markup Language (Ragouzis, Hughes, Philpott, Maier, Madsen, & 
Scavo, 2008) defines how to express assertions and how to exchange them between 
trusting parties. 
An assertion is usually created by an asserting party. It conveys a piece of information in 
form of statements about the requesting party. As depicted in Figure 3.7, SAML supports 
three different kinds of assertions: authentication, authorization decision, and attribute 
statement decision types. All these assertions are issued by an asserting party that the 
relaying (receiving) party may trust. 
 
Figure 3.7: SAML Assertion Types 
• An authentication statement conveys or references the authentication context. This 
context allows defining the type of authentication and the specific time at which the 
authentication was done.  
• An authorization decision statement defines which specific operations on which 
resources the authorized party is entitled to or not. The authorization statement may 
reference further assertions and conditions, upon which the authorization was 
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made. Conditions allow placing restrictions such as restricting the potential relying 
parties or a validity period of the assertion. 
• Finally, an attribute statement defines one or more specific attributes about the 
subject that can be utilized by a relying party. 
In addition to assertion tokens, SAML supports various profiles for real-world scenarios, 
such as single sign-on (SSO) and attribute-based authorization (Bertino, Martino, Paci, & 
Squicciarini, 2009).  
• Single Sign-On allows a subject, if authenticated once, to access additional 
resources, without any additional authentication. SAML enables the SSO through 
the communication of an assertion from one side to another one. 
• Attribute-based Authorization allows deriving some characteristics of subject 
depending on which an authorization to some resources is granted or not. 
 (Ragouzis, Hughes, Philpott, Maier, Madsen, & Scavo, 2008) point out “privacy generally 
refers to both a user’s ability to control how their identity data is shared and used, and to 
mechanisms that inhibit their actions at multiple service providers from being 
inappropriately correlated”. As SAML is often deployed in scenarios where privacy must 
be explicitly addressed, the standard specification supports the following mechanisms: 
• The establishment of pseudonyms (instead of an identity) between an identity 
provider and a service provider. Such pseudonyms are unique and cannot be shared 
between service providers. 
• The establishment of transient identifiers. These identifiers can be described as 
one-time tickets. The service provider is not able to recognize the same user on 
repeated request of a service. 
• The establishment of claim-based facts of a user. These facts can be negotiated 
between the issuer and the identity provider (issuing party). The service provider 
may only recognize the claims made about the user, but not the identity itself. 
 
3.2.3.6 eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 
XACML (Moses, et al., 2005) is a specification for defining access control policies. At its 
core, the XACML language defines the syntax for policies, the semantics for processing 
those policies, and the data flow model for the participants. 
The most elementary element in a XACML policy is a rule. As shown in Figure 3.8, Figure 
3.8: XACML Policy Language Modela rule consists of a target, effect, and condition. A 
target defines a set of resources, subjects, actions, and environments to which the rule 
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should apply. A rule always has an effect that defines the consequence of an evaluation to 
“true”. The effect allows two values:  “permit” or “deny”. An optional condition may 
further refine the applicability of the rule defined by its target (Bertino, Martino, Paci, & 
Squicciarini, 2009). 
The rules are combined in a policy, and multiple policies can be combined in a PolicySet. 
To define the order in which rules and policies are to be evaluated, XACML defines a set 
of rule and policy combining algorithms, namely: deny-overrides, ordered-deny-overrides, 
permit-overrides, ordered-permit-overrides, first-applicable, and only-one-applicable.  
 
 
Figure 3.8: XACML Policy Language Model (Moses, et al., 2005)  
3.2.3.7 WS-Trust 
WS-Trust (Lawrence, et al., 2009) is a framework that augments WS-Security specification 
by defining functionalities for security token management and brokering trust 
relationships.  
The general security model in WS-Trust is based on the exchange of security tokens that 
are issued by a Security Token Service (STS). The most common scenario is that a relying 
party may define policies that oblige the requestor to provide a predefined set of claims. If 
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the requestor does not provide the required claims issued by a trusted STS, the relying 
party ignores or rejects the request. 
3.2.3.8 WS-SecureConversation and WS-ReliableMessaging 
The WS-SecureConversations specification (Nadalin, Goodner, Gudgin, Barbir, & 
Granqvist, 2009) builds on top of WS-Security and defines extension mechanisms for 
establishing security context and sharing the session key material. The security context is 
typically used for exchanging SOAP messages for the lifetime of a communication session. 
The standard defines three different ways of establishing a security context. All of them 
reuse the mechanisms defined in WS-Trust. The first way is using the STS for the 
distribution of security context tokens. However, a security context token can be also 
created by a communicating party and propagated to other participants. The last approach 
represents the establishing of security context through a negotiation process among the 
communicating parties.  
The WS-ReliableMessaging (Fremantle, et al., 2007) standard provides a modular and 
extensible mechanism for managing the reliable delivery of messages. The specification 
defines four types of delivery assurances: 
• The AtLeastOnce assurance guarantees that each message is delivered at least once 
or an error must be raised. 
• The AtMostOnce assurance guarantees that each message is delivered a most once. 
• The ExactlyOnce assurance guarantees that each message is delivered exactly 
once. If a message cannot be delivered then an error must be raised by one of the 
endpoints. 
• The InOrder assurance guarantees that a sequence of messages is delivered in the 
same order in which they were sent. 
3.2.3.9 WS-Policy 
WS-Policy framework (Vedamuthu, Orchard, Hirsch, Hondo, Yendluri, & Boubez, 2007) 
provides a general purpose model for expressing policies that may refer to any kind of 
Web services characteristics, domain-specific capabilities or requirements. 
A policy in WS-Policy is defined as a collection of policy alternatives. These, in turn, 
describe a set of policy assertions. Policy assertions represent acceptable combinations and 
requirements, such as authentication or integrity assertions for SOAP messages that have 
to be met.  
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3.3 Business Process Management 
The term Business Process Management encompasses the modeling and management of 
business processes. The WfMC (Workflow Management Coalition, 1999) defines a 
business process as “a set of one or more linked procedures or activities which collectively 
realize a business objective or policy goal, normally within the context of an 
organizational structure defining functional roles and relationships.” 
Most enterprises have a repeatable set of processes that contribute to the value chain of an 
organization. These patterns of processes are so-called process models. A process model is 
a template from which a process or process instance with parameterized data is 
instantiated. Business processes that are carried in whole in part by computers are called 
workflow models and their instances, respectively, workflow or workflow instances as 
shown in Figure 3.9. 
 
Figure 3.9: Distinction between process, workflow, and their models (Leymann & Roller, Production 
workflow: Concepts and Techniques, 2000) 
For process models two lifecycles are generally distinguished (Workflow Management 
Coalition, 1999):  
• build-time, when the layout and input/output requirements of a process are modeled  
• run-time, when instances of the designed process are executed.  
To provide a better understanding of the concept (Leymann & Roller, Production 
workflow: Concepts and Techniques, 2000) proposed a three dimensional view of 
workflows as shown in Figure 3.10. 
The Process Logic Dimension of a workflow describes what in terms of what activities and 
in which order they need to be performed. Each process is composed of activities and/or 
sub-processes. An activity is an element that performs a specific function in a process 
3.  Fundamentals 
33 
 
(Papazoglou, 2008). At a very abstract level there are two types of activities: automated 
activities that are enacted by a workflow engine and those which are not (manual 
activities). The activities are connected with the arrows which show the flow of control 
from one activity to the next. 
The Organization Dimension defines who should perform each activity. Typically, an 
activity is assigned to a certain role or department in an organization. At runtime a special 
query is performed in order to identify the set of people authorized to perform an activity. 
If the activity does not have any human interaction, the workflow management may 
perform the activity on behalf of the requesting user.  
The last dimension defines, which IT resources (programs, Web Services, etc.) are required 
to perform each activity within workflow instance. 
 
Figure 3.10: Three dimensions of a workflow (Leymann & Roller, Production workflow: Concepts and 
Techniques, 2000) 
To define business processes a large number of business process modeling languages 
(Mili, Jaoude, Lefebvre, & Petrenko, 2003), (Lu & Sadiq, 2007) have been developed. The 
number of well-recognized and standardized languages is smaller, but on the other hand, it 
has to be considered, that most prominent languages such as BPMN, gained a lot of 
criticism (Muehlen & Recker, 2008), (Aagesen & Krogstie, 2010). Further, as some 
empirically validated case studies state: focus of the research in business process 
management is not always well aligned with the needs of industry (Indulska, Recker, 
Rosemann, & Green, 2009), (Recker, 2010). Thus, our approach is to review most 
promising technologies and standards, as detailed in the following Sections 3.3.1-3.3.3. 
Based on this information we introduce a general workflow model in Chapter 4 that 
provides a technology-independent view and can be applied to many recent technologies. 
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3.3.1 WS Business Process Execution Language (WS-BPEL) 
The major execution language for business processes is WS-BPEL (Alves, et al., 2007).  
The language was standardized by the OASIS consortium and is widely used in the 
industry to provide interoperability between applications. WS-BPEL is an XML language 
that utilizes many open standards and technologies such as WSDL, XML Schema and 
XSLT. One of the most shortcomings is the fact that WS-BPEL provides no standard 
graphical notation for its language.  
3.3.1.1 Variables 
Variables are used to store data within a particular scope in a WS-BPEL process. The 
variables may be bound to: an input activity, such as <receive> or <pick>, to an outbound 
activity of a synchronous <invoke>, or to an <assign> activity.  
3.3.1.2 Activities 
The WS-BPEL language classifies its activities into two main categories: the basic 
(atomic) activities and the structured (compound) activities that may contain other basic or 
structured activities.  
3.3.1.3 Scopes 
In WS-BPEL a scope is a collection of activities that can have its own local variables and 
activities. This concept is similar to scopes in other programming languages.  
3.3.1.4 WS-BPEL Extensions Mechanism 
The WS-BPEL standard supports an extension mechanism for the extension of the existing 
or the definition of completely new activities. Typically, these extensions are declared with 
the help of separate XML Namespaces that may be optional or mandatory for the execution 
engine.  
One of the most prominent extensions is BPEL4People, which has been published by 
BEA, IBM, Oracle, and SAP (Agrawal, et al., 2007). BPEL4People allows specifying 
users who have to perform the WS-BPEL activities directly in the process by defining user 
identifiers or groups of people. However, the specification does not provide any support 
for how the assignment is done or how to enforce constraints like separation of duties. 
3.3.2 Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) 
The Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN) v.1.2 (White, et al., 2009), which was 
developed and maintained under the coordination of OMG (Object Management Group), is 
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one of widely known notation (visual modeling) languages. As to time of this writing the 
final version of BPMN 2.0 was released. The new version promises to provide 
comprehensive operational semantics for executing processes. As the discussion about 
BPMN 2.0 potential use, its shortcomings, and its future role is going on (Völzer, 2010) 
(Leymann, BPEL vs. BPMN 2.0: Should You Care?, 2010), this thesis concentrates on 
BPMN v.1.2 as a typical representative of a visual modeling language. 
The business process models in BPMN are expressed in business process diagrams (BPD). 
(Weske, 2007) divides the core modeling elements in BPD into four categories as shown in 
Figure 3.11: 
 
Figure 3.11: Core BPMN elements and its categories (Weske, 2007) 
• Flow objects. Flow objects consist of activities, events, and gateways. Activities 
represent the work to be done. Events are used to represent states relevant for a 
business process. Gateways represent the split or join behavior in the control flow 
between activities. 
• Swimlanes. Swimlanes represent organizational aspects and consist of pools and 
lanes. Pool is a notion for organizations and lanes represent organizational entities 
such as roles in an organization. 
• Artefacts. Artefacts consist of data objects, groups, and annotations. These 
elements represent additional information associated with flow elements. As the 
BPMN specification states (White, et al., 2009) artefacts “are not directly relevant 
for sequence flow or message flow of the process”, and thus, serve only 
documentation and information purposes. Data object element is used to document 
the data object used by an activity. Text annotation provides additional information 
in a textual form. Group object does not have any formal meaning and is used to 
group any elements of a process. 
• Connecting Objects. Connecting objects consist of sequence flow, message flow 
and association objects. These are used to connect the elements of the flow objects, 
swimlanes and artefacts. Sequence flow (control flow) specifies the execution order 
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of flow objects, message flow defines the flow of messages between swimlanes, 
and association is used to link artefacts to flow objects.  
3.3.3 Workflow Foundation (WF) 
The Windows Workflow Foundation (WF) is a technology for building workflow-centric 
applications introduced by Microsoft. The API provides a lightweight workflow engine 
that supports long-running processes, as well as workflows involving human interaction. 
As WF provides a considerable support of workflow patterns (Zapletal, van der Aalst, 
Russell, Liegl, & Werthner, 2009) and a highly customizable incorporation in any type of 
.NET applications and technologies, we used this technology for our prototypical 
implementation. 
As shown in Figure 3.12: Windows Workflow Architecture (Microsoft, 2011), the 
Windows Workflow Foundation can be divided into three parts: runtime services, runtime 
engine, and activity library. Further, WF supports an extension mechanism that allows 
extending the existing activity libraries and services. 
The standard activity library provides a long list of elements that can be used to compose a 
workflow. According to (Bukovics, 2010) the activities can be organized into the following 
categories: 
• Procedural Flow. The Procedural Flow category consists of flow control activities 
that determine activities that implement branching and looping.    
• Flowchart. The Flowchart provides free-form and flexible links between activities 
to control the flow of execution.  
• Collection. The Collection category consists of activities that allow working with 
collections of data. 
• Messaging. The Messaging category provides activities that allow communicating 
with other applications and Web services.  
• Transactions. The Transactions category provides functionality to ensure the 
consistency of transactions. This category includes compensation activities that 
ensure the consistency by undoing activities that have already been completed. 
• Error Handling. The Error Handling category provides support for the handling of 
exceptions. The activities are similar to the try/catch code blocks in programming 
languages. 
 
3.  Fundamentals 
37 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Windows Workflow Architecture (Microsoft, 2011) 
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4 Workflow Model Concept and Specification 
In the previous chapters, some essential fundamentals in workflows and security were 
introduced. Based on the presented business modeling constructs a general workflow 
model and according access model are discussed. The elaborated models and their 
terminology are used as a basis for the security framework provided in the next chapter. 
4.1 Conceptual Terminology 
To capture complexity, different abstraction concepts exist. The same can be applied to a 
workflow model, which may be expressed in different ways. The consequence is that 
several workflow models and notions in literature exist. It is unquestionable that not even 
one of these models can pretend to be the only true, not to mention the fact that no 
complete representation will ever exist. As a consequence, this analysis does not pretend to 
present a complete and unique view on workflow models. 
The main goal is to provide a sufficient, extensible and technology-independent model 
appropriate for further discussion. The presented model was motivated by the process 
viewing patterns presented in (Schumm, Leymann, & Streule, 2010). 
For a better conception, this analysis begins with the atomic and semantically reasonable 
parts and gradually brings it to a concept of a workflow model as a whole.  
 
Figure 4.1: Dependency hierarchy of an agent, operation, and resource 
Each piece of work on some materials must be performed by someone. An agent5
                                                 
5 The meaning of an “agent” as proposed in this thesis is semantically equivalent to that of a “role” in 
(Leymann & Roller, Production workflow: Concepts and Techniques, 2000). But the notion of a “role” is 
misleading and collides with a general concept of an agent. An agent is what can be identified and assigned 
 is 
someone who performs some operations on some resources. Thus, a dependency tree as 
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shown in Figure 4.1 can be derived. A combination of an agent, an operation, and a piece 
of resources is called an activity.  
 
Figure 4.2: An activity is a combination of an agent, operation, and resource 
To define an order and some attribute-based conditions of an activity, a set of predefined 
rules is required. This set of rules is called an activity condition6
The distinction between them is subtle but important: An activation condition is bound to a 
piece of information which must evaluate to true to invoke the associated activity, while 
the execution condition is a condition that holds a control of the activated activity or 
several iterations of it, as long as the execution condition is not fulfilled. To give an 
example, the activation condition of an activity B may be based on the fact of the previous 
execution of an activity A. The execution condition of an activity may be the fact that the 
utilization of a specific resource has to be at least 80 %. Only after these values have been 
achieved, the flow of control is passed to the next activities in the graph.  
. The set of rules in an 
activity condition is divided into two parts: activation conditions and execution 
conditions.  
A workflow is a set of activities that are connected together in the form of a directed 
graph. A directed graph is a set of nodes and a set of ordered pairs of vertices called 
directed edges. In the case of a workflow: the nodes are the activities and the directed 
edges are the arrows. Those arrows and the activity conditions represent the control flow 
in a workflow. 
Further, as shown in Figure 4.3, a distinction has to be made between a model and its 
instances. A workflow model is a template for some concrete instances of it. There may be 
multiple instances of a particular workflow model. An executing instance of a workflow 
                                                                                                                                                    
to perform a particular operation. The identity of it can be almost everything from IP address to a hierarchical 
property, or any combinations of it.  
6 In a broader sense, an activity condition can be understood as a set of constraints on an activity. 
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model is called a workflow instance. An agent who is executing an operation in a concrete 
instance is called an executing agent7
 
.  
Figure 4.3: A Workflow Model and its Workflow Instances 
In a sum, four main components that can be identified in a workflow model: 
• Agents. An agent who performs operations on some resources. 
• Operations. An operation that specifies a set of transitions on some resources.   
• Resources. A resource is something that is target of some operations in a workflow. 
• Activity Conditions. An activity condition that defines a set of rules for the 
activation and execution of an activity. 
4.2 Conceptual Workflow Model 
Each business process has a specific business goal. An agent is a generic name for 
someone or something that has to carry out the assigned operations. Further, it can be 
assumed that: 
• There are several agents performing operations in a workflow. 
• Each agent has its own set of assigned operations. 
• Each operation is performed in context of some assigned agent. 
• The agents may belong to different organizational structures. 
                                                 
7 An „executing agent“ is semantically equivalent to the notion of an „agent“ in (Leymann & Roller, 
Production workflow: Concepts and Techniques, 2000) 
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• The operations that cross organizational boundaries may require different 
communication and security mechanisms as the local ones.  
4.2.1 Agent Lanes 
The operations can be organized in agent lanes8
 
. An agent lane implies an assigned agent 
and a set of operations and in a predefined order. The assigned agent has to perform the 
operations according the control flow within the agent lane. 
Figure 4.4: Agent Lane 
To give an example, in Figure 4.4 the identity of the assigned agent has to perform 
operations A, B, and C in a sequence order. An identity is a piece of information that 
reliably identifies the executing agent. 
4.2.2 Agent Assignment Types 
As shown in Figure 4.5: Agent Assignment TypesFigure 4.5, the specification of an agent 
to identify that has to perform the defined operations may be defined in a direct or 
indirect way. The indirect agent assignment provides the ability to specify a group of 
suitable agents, which share similar characteristics (e.g.: Manager role, or a German IP 
address). The actual executing agent is only known at run-time. On the other hand, the 
identity of the executing agent made by the direct assignment is already known at build 
time (e.g.: UserID). 
                                                 
8 This concept is similar to the concept of a lane in BPMN. 
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Figure 4.5: Agent Assignment Types 
4.2.3 Operations 
Each business process language, as may be noticed in the previous chapter, provides a 
comprehensive set of various operations. The BPMN language, to give an example, 
classifies the operations on the nature of the action to be performed. The operations are 
divided into: send, receive, user, manual, business rule, service, and script operations.  
 
Figure 4.6: Multiple Agent Lines 
In order to keep the concept lean and succinct, only few fundamental assumptions are 
made: 
• The flow of activities is implicit, meaning that after activity conditions have been 
fulfilled, the assigned operation was completed, and not faulted; the control flow is 
passed to the next connected activity. 
• As the difference between the local and remote operations is of great importance 
in security, the assumption is made, that the connection between security lanes is 
generally unsure. To illustrate that aspect, the flow can be visualized with a dotted 
line, as shown in Figure 4.6. This style of visualization has similarities to the 
message flow in BPMN.  
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4.2.4 Resources 
 
Figure 4.7: Resource Types 
Resources can be classified into three main categories as shown Figure 4.7: 
• Physical goods have a physical representation in a real world, such as a palette of 
perishables.  
• Human resources are usually those resources that are used by executing agents to 
perform the assigned operations. To give an example, the applicants in a hiring 
process are the human resources, whereas hiring employees performing the 
operation “approve or reject applicants” are the executing agents.  
• The last category of resources is information. In broader sense, everything that can 
be represented in a digital form may be handled as an information resource.  
4.3 Conceptual Access Control Model 
Due to their distributed nature workflow scenarios involve many security-critical 
operations. Based on security concepts in (Meier, et al., 2008) we present a general access 
control model in Section 4.3.1-4.3.3 that enables the enforcement of authentication and 
authorization in workflow related systems.  
4.3.1 Authentication 
Authentication ensures that the requesting party is really what it pretends to be. As shown 
in Figure 4.8, the authentication can be distinguished as: manual, user-name-based, 
certificate- and security token-based authentication. 
 
Figure 4.8: Authentication Types 
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• Manual. This type of authentication involves human or any physical resources for 
a successful request. To give an example, presenting a passport in an airport at the 
ticket counter involves airline employees for a successful check-in. 
• UserName. UserName-based authentication requires the requesting party to 
provide a username and password. The requested services typically validate the 
credentials against a custom store. Typical examples are the Active Directory in 
Windows networks or the membership providers in database systems. 
• Certificate. The requesting party has to provide a client certificate that the 
requested service looks up. For a successful authentication the requested service 
has to trust the issuer of the certificate.    
• Security Token. The Security Token authentication is based on the WS-Trust 
specification. The basic idea is to externalize the authentication process to an 
external service, called the Security Token Service (STS), as shown in Figure 4.9. 
All needed information for a successful authentication is negotiated by the caller 
with the STS. The whole procedure consists of a total of three steps. The requesting 
party wants to access a resource that requires a security token. After successful 
negotiation (e.g. by presenting the required credentials) the STS issues a token that 
the requester passes through to the initial workflow service. The workflow service 
validates the token and authenticates the caller. 
 
Figure 4.9: Authentication/Authorization with Security Token Service (Bayer, 2008) 
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4.3.2 Authorization 
As shown in Figure 4.10 authorization can be divided into three types (Meier, et al., 2008): 
role-based, claim-based and impersonation-based9
 
:   
Figure 4.10: Authorization Types 
• Role-based. The authorization decision is made on basis of evaluating the role 
membership of a caller.  
• Claim-based. Claim-based authorization widens the role-based concept to any type 
of caller related information. A claim is a statement about a caller: for example, a 
name, an IP address, a key, or any further capability.  
• Impersonation-based. Impersonation-based authorization is a concept, where the 
requested service impersonates the requestor’s identity prior to call the associated 
resources.  
4.3.3 Impersonation 
 
Figure 4.11: Impersonation Types 
The concept of impersonation is based on the “Delegated Key Transfer” mechanism in 
WS-Trust specification (Lawrence, et al., 2009). The main goal is to allow one party to 
transfer the right to use the own identity to another party. A common usage is for example 
in business letters, which are signed on behalf of another person. Based on the elaborated 
classification in (Meier, et al., 2008), three different types of impersonation can be 
distinguished: 
                                                 
9 In conjunction with Windows access control lists also known as “resource-base authorization” (Meier, et 
al., 2008)  
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• Anonymous. The requested party authenticates the requesting party as anonymous 
and cannot obtain any information for impersonation. 
• Identification. The requested party gets requestor’s identity but must not use it for 
impersonation. 
• Delegation. The requested party gets requestor’s identity and is allowed to use it 
for impersonation. 
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5 Security Model Concept and Specification 
Based on the previous conceptual workflow model, this chapter introduces a security 
framework that entails four layers: business modeling layer, security goals layer, security 
requirements, and security implementations layer. 
The analysis begins with the construction of the main security goals and their mapping to 
the business modeling layer. The security goals are enforced by the security requirements; 
these in turn are realized with the technology-independent and platform-independent 
security mechanisms introduced in Section 3.2.3. For each layer a description of possible 
combinations to the underlying layer is elaborated. At the end of each section the devised 
concepts are summarized in transition matrices. 
5.1 General Concept 
To visualize and to incorporate security into business processes we propose to view 
security in several levels of abstraction as shown in Figure 5.1. The order of arrangement 
in layers is done with the focus on the domain experts. Typically, the domain expert is 
assisted with a toolset of modeling elements that provide support for building a visual 
representation of the desired business process. After completion, the finished model is used 
as a template for the execution or as an instrument of communication with the 
stakeholders, or both.  
Based on these considerations, the first layer of the security framework is the “Business 
Process Modeling” layer. The presented layer is intended to provide a unified and 
readable representation of a business process applicable to any recent technology. The 
concept and its vocabulary base on the workflow model were presented in Chapter 4. 
In essence, it can be assumed, that domain experts, who typically model the business 
processes, have often little knowledge of the security modeling. Thus, the resulting 
requirements can be defined as follows: 
• Modeling of security should happen in a transparent fashion, so that the 
incorporation of security can be easily understood by domain experts.  
• A business process modeling environment should actively assist the domain expert 
in designing secure business processes.  
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Figure 5.1: Conceptual Security Framework 
The next layer is the “Security Goals” layer. The security goals that can be automatically 
or semi-automatically derived from the context of the modeled business processes are 
named as the implicit security goals. These goals can be seamlessly integrated into the 
modeling environment and usually require no additional training. Unfortunately, not all 
security goals fall into this category. Those security goals that require profound knowledge 
or active involvement of the domain expert belong to a category of explicit security goals. 
These types of requirements have usually a representational shape with configurable 
attributes similar to other business modeling elements in the modeling environment. A 
sophisticated design of the modeling environment must consider both approaches.  
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The third “Security Requirements” layer, as the name already indicates, describes the 
security requirements, which are used to enforce the security goals. The security goals can 
be realized in a multitude of ways. Thus, several security mechanisms have to be addressed 
and discussed for each element of the security requirements layer. 
The last “Security Implementations” layer provides possible implementation 
mechanisms of the identified constructs in the requirements layer. The security 
mechanisms rely on the technology-independent specifications introduced in fundamentals. 
However, as in our motivating example can be extended or replaced with platform or 
implementation dependent mechanism.  
5.2 Business Process Modeling Layer 
 
Figure 5.2: Modeling Layer Constructs 
The concept of the incorporation of security requirements should be technology-neutral 
and applicable to other business process languages. To achieve the desired effect, the 
number of constructs should be kept to a minimum, but at the same time these constructs 
should be expressive enough, to represent the most essential aspects of a workflow 
environment. To provide a meaningful definition of the security requirements the 
aforementioned categories of the previous chapter must further be refined as shown in 
Figure 5.2. 
The following tables summarize the presented business modeling constructs and the related 
security goals.  
Name: Agent (WHO Dimension) 
10 
Definition: An agent is someone who is assigned to perform 
some operations on some resources. 
Types: Assigned Agent, Executing Agent. 
 
                                                 
10 The icons in Sections 5.2-5.4 were adapted/reused from the OSA Icon Library 11.02, available at 
http://www.opensecurityarchitecture.org under Creative Commons Licence (CC BY-SA 3.0). 
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Description: • Assigned Agent. An assigned agent is someone who is assigned at 
build time to perform an operation at runtime. 
• Executing Agent. An execution agent is someone who is 
performing an assigned operation at runtime.  
Related 
Security 
Goals: 
• Assigned Agent. Authentication, Privacy. 
• Executing Agent. Authentication, Privacy, Availability.  
 
Name: Operation ( WHAT Dimension) 
 
Definition: An operation is a unit of work performed by an 
agent. 
Types: Local Operation, Remote Operation. 
Description: • Local Operation. A local operation is usually under control of the 
workflow management system and exists within same boundaries 
as the deployed instance of a workflow model.  
• Remote Operation. A remote operation has usually a remote 
location and is invoked using various messaging protocols. 
Related 
Security 
Goals: 
• Local Operation.  Authorization, Audit, Non-Repudiation. 
• Remote Operation. Authorization, Audit, Non-Repudiation, 
Privacy. 
 
Name: Resource (WITH Dimension) 
 
Definition: A resource is something that is target of some 
operation(s) in a business process. 
Types: Physical Goods, Human Resources, Information. 
Description: • Physical Goods. Physical goods represent any kind of material 
resources that are utilized in a business process model.  
• Human Resources. Human resources are people involved in a 
business process as a target of the defined operations.  
• Information. Information is everything that can be represented in a 
digital form. Information resources encompass a wide range of 
resources: from a text file to a complete business process. 
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Related 
Security 
Goals: 
• Physical Goods.  Authorization, Availability. 
• Human Resources.  Availability. 
• Information. Authorization, Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Availability. 
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Security Goals 
Authentication x x      
Authorization     x  x 
Confidentiality   x x   x 
Integrity       x 
Availability  x   x x x 
Audit   x x    
Non-Repudiation   x x    
Privacy x x  x    
Table 5.1: Modeling Constructs & Security Goals Matrix 
 
The related security goals can be summarized as shown Table 5.1. The agent must be 
authenticated for any further operation in a workflow system environment. Further, the 
executing agent must be available at execution time. The operation may require 
confidentiality and in case of a remote operation, privacy related requirements. The 
operations performed by an agent must be able to support non-repudiation, meaning 
preventing agents from denying having performed the according operation. The non-
repudiation is an important prerequisite for the audit goal that ensures the collection of all 
security related information. The resources should be available when they needed. Finally, 
the information resources should provide an access control in form of authorization and 
support the confidentiality and integrity of data. 
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5.3 Security Goals 
The previously discussed security goals involve the enforcement of several security 
mechanisms. The following tables present a context for each security goal under which the 
problem or the requirement occurs. The concept describes what preconditions must be met, 
how the goals can be realized with the related security mechanisms, and what constraints 
are to be considered. 
Name: Authentication 
 
Context: Recognize and verify the identity of an agent. 
Constraints: The requirement can be only applied to assigned 
and executing agents. 
Concept: The requirement is closely linked to access control policies. The 
authenticating party must be able to trust the authenticating subject. 
Further, there must be a possibility to negotiate further requirements, such 
as confidentiality and integrity requirements. The negotiated requirements 
may result in a need for a security session and a public key infrastructure 
(PKI). The authenticating party must be able to validate the signature of 
the authenticating subject. 
Related 
Requirements 
Access Control Policies, Identity Authentication, PKI Infrastructure, 
Security Policies, Single-Sign-On, Trust Relationship. 
 
Name: Authorization 
 
Context: Grant or deny a request made by an agent to 
controlled resources.   
Constraints: The requirement can be only applied to operations 
and resources. The prerequisite is a successful 
authentication of the security subject. 
Concept: The requirement implies that access control policies to the related 
resources and operations are defined. Further, access control may require 
further security policies, which in turn, may result in a need for security 
context (eg to be exchanged sequence of messages) and a public key 
infrastructure (PKI). The authenticated identity must have a valid 
signature that can be trusted.  
Related 
Requirements: 
Access Control Policies, PKI Infrastructure, Security Policies, Signature, 
Single-Sign-On, Trust Relationship.  
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Name: Confidentiality 
 
Context: Ensure the protection of information from 
improper and unauthorized disclosure. 
Constraints: The requirement can be only applied to operations 
and resources. Confidentiality may require 
appropriate cryptographic key material or/and 
access control policies to support successful 
authorization of the security subject making a 
request to an object. 
Concept: The requirement implies the use of encryption mechanisms. The 
enforcement of confidentiality can be expressed in negotiated or 
predefined security policies. 
Related  
Requirements: 
Encryption, Security Session. 
 
Name: Integrity 
 
Context: Ensure the protection of information from 
unauthorized modification. 
Constraints: The requirements can be only applied to 
resources. 
Concept: The requirement implies the use of signature and mechanisms of reliable 
delivery of information. 
Related  
Requirements: 
Content Integrity, Delivery Guarantee, Signature. 
 
Name: Availability 
 
Context: Ensure readiness of correct operations and 
resources to agents when they are entitled to. 
Constraints: The requirement can be only applied to resources 
and executing agents. 
Concept: The requirement implies the use of security policies and mechanisms of 
reliable delivery of information. 
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Related  
Requirements: 
Delivery Guarantee, Security Policies. 
 
Name: Audit 
 
Context: Ensure the collection and organization of 
information to discover security violations. 
Constraints: The requirement can be only applied to referring 
operations. The prerequisite is a successful 
authentication, maintaining integrity and non-
repudiation of the performed operations. 
Concept: The requirement implies successful authentication, which in turn requires 
a valid signature of the performing agent. 
Related 
Requirements: 
Auditing, Identity Authentication, Signature. 
 
Name: Non-repudiation 
 
Context: Prevent an agent from denying having performed 
a particular operation.  
Constraints: The requirement can be only applied to the 
referring operations. The prerequisite is a 
successful authentication and maintaining 
integrity. 
Concept: The requirement implies a valid signature and a trusted relationship with 
communicating parties. 
Related 
Requirements: 
Signature, Trust Relationship. 
 
Name: Privacy 
 
Context: Enable privacy-related policies. 
Constraints: Privacy can be only applied to the remote 
operations. 
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Concept: Besides the encryption mechanisms privacy requires a relatively complex 
privacy infrastructure. For example, the privacy requirement may 
prescribe to the authentication service, which data of an agent should not 
be shared to parties that require authentication and authorization. 
Related  
Requirements: 
Privacy, Encryption. 
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Security 
Requirements 
Access Control 
Policies 
x x x      
Auditing      x   
Content Integrity    x     
Delivery Guarantee    x x    
Encryption   x     x 
PKI Infrastructure x x       
Privacy Policies        x 
Security Policies x x       
Security Session   x x     
Signature  x  x  x x  
Single-Sign-On x        
Trust Relationship x x     x  
Table 5.2: Security Goals and Related Security Requirements Matrix. 
5.4 Security Requirements 
Recent advances of Web service technology alleviate the implementation of security 
mechanisms in open and highly dynamic environments. Despite the heterogeneity of the 
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underlying security implementations those standards efficiently increase the 
interoperability and the manageability in business process driven environments. Thus, our 
framework basically focuses on recent and/or recognized open standards, without 
addressing, for example, transport security algorithms and implementations such as SSL 
(Secure Sockets Layer). As our prototypical implementation shows, such a technology-
independent approach is not detrimental and can be easily extended or replaced with any 
platform or implementation dependent mechanisms. 
The following tables present a context for each security requirement under which the 
problem may occur. The concept describes what preconditions must be met, how the 
requirements can be realized with the related security mechanisms, and what constraints 
are to be considered. 
 
Name: Access Control Policies 
 
Context: Define access control policies for resources that 
need to be controlled. 
Concept: An access control policy restricts which agents may 
perform which operations on which resources. 
Access control models, as presented in related 
work, provide a set of requirements for the access 
control policies. The derived rules, intended 
consequences, and the target, on which the rules are 
applied, may be very different in nature. The 
implementing mechanisms must be able to cope 
with various standards and allow flexible extension 
mechanisms for new access control profiles. 
 
Security 
Mechanisms: 
XACML. 
 
Name: Auditing 
 
Context: Facilitate the capturing of security relevant 
operations providing irrefutable evidence of all 
security relevant events. 
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Concept: The audit requirement must allow analyzing logs, 
reports, and other information that allows indicating 
security violations. The support of auditing depends 
on the underlying implementation of the 
infrastructure, and is not directly addressed by any 
WS*- standard. 
 
Security 
Mechanisms: 
Infrastructure. 
 
Name: Content Integrity 
 
Context: Provide data integrity, which allows verifying that 
data has not been manipulated in transit, and is 
correct and complete. 
Concept: To ensure integrity, data must be protected from 
being modified, e.g. by using a signature. The 
semantic integrity, meaning that the data is correct 
and complete, is usually enforced by a schema, e.g. 
XML schema. 
Security 
Mechanisms: 
XML Signature, XML schema. 
 
Name: Delivery Guarantee 
 
Context: Prevent data from being lost, duplicated, or 
reordered. 
Problem: Ensuring delivery guarantee involves several 
quality of service assurances between the 
communicating endpoints. The implementing 
standard has to support: at most once, at least once, 
exactly once, and in order semantics.  
 
Security 
Mechanisms: 
WS-Reliability. 
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Name: Encryption 
 
Context: Provide a confidentiality of data. 
Concept: The encrypting mechanism must provide an end-to-
end mechanism that assures confidentiality of data 
traversing multiple intermediaries. The 
implementing mechanism should allow separating 
and referencing the encrypted data from the 
encryption information, and vice versa. 
Security 
Mechanisms: 
XML-Encryption. 
 
Name: Public Key Infrastructure 
 
Context: Provide management for signature and digital 
certificates. 
Concept: As public keys are the basic blocks for various 
types of data security is it particularly important to 
ensure a management of creation, distribution, and 
revocation in a consistent and uniform fashion. 
 
Security 
Mechanisms: 
XML Key Management Standard. 
 
Name: Privacy 
 
Context: Capture and enforce privacy policies. 
Concept: Identity may encompass some attributes and 
characteristics that should be shared only with the 
access point. It should be possible to define policies 
that prevent or restrict further usage, e.g. in single-
sign-on scenarios.   
Security 
Mechanisms: 
SAML, XACML. 
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Name: Security Policies 
 
Context: Provide a model for expressing various types of 
security policies. 
Concept: The security policies should be able to cover a 
broad field of security requirements, such as 
integrity and confidentiality of data. The 
requirements should be expressible in assertions 
that specify a behavior that is mandatory or optional 
requirement, or a capability of a policy target. 
Security 
Mechanisms: 
WS-Policy, WS-SecurityPolicy, WS-PolicyAttachment, WS-
PolicyAssertion. 
 
Name: Security Session 
 
Context: Provide a secure communication across multiple 
boundaries. 
Concept: To establish and to manage a secure session, several 
preconditions must be met. At first, the session 
protocol must allow end-to-end scenarios with 
involvement of multiple communicating parties. 
Further, the security session must be able to provide 
a security context, which is shared among related 
endpoints for the lifetime of the session. The 
communicating parties belonging to the same 
session should be also able to reference the security 
context (instead of attaching it to each piece of 
data), in order to achieve a more efficient exchange 
of data. WS-SecureConversation, which builds on 
WS-Security and WS-Trust, satisfies all these 
requirements and allows different strategies for 
establishing a security context.  
Security 
Mechanisms: 
WS-SecureConversation, WS-Security, WS-Trust. 
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Name: Signature 
 
Context: Provide an end-to-end mechanism for signing data. 
Concept: The signing mechanism must not only provide an 
end-to-end mechanism, but also support multiple 
packing strategies. The packing strategies must 
allow attaching and referencing signature to XML 
and Non-XML data files, or in case of XML, any 
part of it. 
Security 
Mechanisms: 
XML Signature. 
 
 
Name: Single-Sign-On 
 
Context: Provide a single access point that grants or denies 
access to further resources and operations without 
being prompted for authentication each time. 
Concept: The standard should supply mechanisms for 
providing a single access point including cross-
domain environments, allowing agents set up 
requests to other domains without having to repeat 
the authentication each time.  
Description: SAML, Infrastructure11 
 
Name: Trust Relationship 
 
Context: Provide an infrastructure for trusting relationships. 
Concept: The standard should provide mechanisms for 
establishing and providing trust relationships across 
security realms.  
Description: WS-Trust. 
 
  
                                                 
11 Our prototype implements an alternative approach of delayed authentication for operations within agent 
lane.  
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Sec. Mechanisms 
SAML x     x    x x 
WS-Policy       x     
WS-Policy 
Attachment 
      x     
WS-Policy 
Assertion 
      x     
WS-Reliability   x         
WS-Secure 
Conversation 
       x    
WS-Security x           
WS-Security 
Policy 
      x     
WS-Trust           x 
XACML x     x      
XML Encryption    x        
XML Key 
Management 
Standard 
    x    x   
XML Signature  x       x  x 
Table 5.3: Security Requirements and Related Security Mechanisms Matrix 
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5.5 Motivating Example 
 To outline how the previously discussed framework can be applied to support domain 
experts, we take the motivating example introduced in the first chapter. Based on the 
retailer operations we are going to investigate each layer of the security framework up to 
the actual implementation.   
 
Figure 5.3: Retailer Lane with Operation Sequence 
As described in Figure 5.3, a retailer lane consists of four sequential operations: Check 
Inventory, Prepare Order, Place Order, and Update Inventory. Check Inventory, and 
Update Inventory operations can be seen as inter-organizational operations, whereas 
Prepare Order and Place Order operations involve the flow of information crossing 
organizational boundaries. 
5.5.1 Agent Security Goals 
 
Figure 5.4: Annotating Retailer Lane with Security Controls 
The modeling of the presented scenario begins with the placing of an agent lane discussed 
in Section 4.2.1. As soon the agent lane element is added to the workplace, the system can 
start assisting the domain expert with implicit security goals as proposed in Section 5.1.  
As all security relevant operations require a prior authentication, the system may advise in 
form of an info dialog or a warning to place an authentication security control. The security 
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controls represent the configurable UI elements for defining and configuring the security 
goals.  
Depending on the preferred type of authentication, the domain expert may choose the 
preferred type of based on the workflow access control model elaborated in Section 4.3.  In 
our case the authentication can be fulfilled based on the username and password 
information of a user account in the referring organization.  
An important constraint of the retailer in the scenario is that all illegal access order 
placements have to be prohibited and traced. Depending on the configuration of the 
considered workflow managing system this step may be initiated implicitly or on explicit 
demand. In our case, the domain expert sets the audit security control explicitly at the top 
of the retailer lane. As the audit can be only applied to agent operations, this placement has 
a meaning equivalent to annotating each operation of the retailer with an audit control.    
5.5.2 Check Inventory Security Goals 
 
Figure 5.5: Retailer and Check Inventory Security Controls 
After placing the retailer lane the Check Inventory operation, as shown in Figure 5.5, can 
be added. This operation requires an appropriate authorization. The workflow management 
system enforces this step by presentencing an error or an info dialog. Depending on the 
configuration and the implemented access control model, the system may advice the type 
of authorization to the referring operation. In our case it is the claim-based authorization 
discussed in Section 4.3.2.  
The technical details of the underlying concepts for the claim-based security can be found 
in Section 6.4.4. 
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5.5.3 Prepare Order Security Goals 
The subsequent Prepare Order operation is a representative example of custom 
authentication and authorization with separate security controls for the associated 
resources.  
 
Figure 5.6: Prepare Order and PDF Resource Security Controls 
The Prepare Order is intended to prepare a digitally signed purchasing order. In the 
presented scenario the prepared order is sent as a PDF document through an e-mail 
gateway. This gateway requires custom credentials that must be provided separately and 
are not of any use to the rest of the scenario. The workflow management system may be 
able to derive the context of the preconfigured Prepare Order operation and enforce the 
input of custom type credentials. 
Besides the mail credentials, the PDF resource must be signed by the executing agent. To 
facilitate compliance with Commercial Code this step involves a non-repudiation security 
control. Depending on the type of authentication, the signature can be derived from the 
agent authentication or added manually to the non-repudiation control. In the presented 
scenario the agent authentication is username-based, so that the certificate has to be 
provided separately.  
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5.5.4 Place Order Security Goals 
 
Figure 5.7: Place Order Security Controls 
The next operation is a typical representation of a remote operation that involves, as shown 
in Figure 5.7, several security controls.  
To begin with, a remote operation requires end-to-end security which in turn is enforced by 
the confidentiality security control. Depending on the underlying implementation the 
confidentiality type can be implicitly derived or as in our case be manually ensured by 
providing a certificate trusted by the referring party. 
The authorization is based on the role the authenticated agent provides. To achieve the 
desired effect the system may imply a role-based authorization security control. 
Finally, as the motivating scenario indicates, the manufacturer, who receives the order, has 
to carry a check of the retailer rating. This is done by sending a request to the rating 
agency. To prevent and detect fraud the rating agency service discloses data only to parties 
this information refers to. As shown in Figure 5.9, this can be done only on the behalf of 
the retailer, by placing a privacy security control. The manufacturer and the rating agency 
have to set the type of authorization for the referring operations to impersonation, as 
described in Section 4.3.2. 
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Figure 5.8: Delegation and Related Security Controls 
5.5.5 Update Inventory Security Goals  
As shown in Figure 5.9 the Update Inventory operation is analogue to the Check Inventory 
Operation. This operation also requires a claim-based authorization, which is authorization 
that can be enforced by the workflow management system enforces by presenting an error 
or an info dialog to the domain expert. 
 
Figure 5.9: Update Inventory Security Control 
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5.5.6 Mapping Security Goals to the Security Requirements 
The additional abstraction layer between the Security Goals and the Security 
Implementation layer brings the advantage of flexible and highly-customizable 
implementation mechanisms of the identified security goals. The Security Requirements 
layer can be mapped not only to the WCF Binding elements and custom implementations, 
as in our prototype, but also to many recent technologies (e.g. Apache Rampart Axis2 
Security Module) (Apache Software Foundation, 2011) that supply the identified security 
features. 
 
Figure 5.10: Security Requirements for Retailer Agent, Check Inventory, and Update Inventory. 
To identify the related security requirements we apply the transitions defined in Table 5.2 
of our security framework. Instead of listing the related security requirements for each 
security goal, we group them into categories that share the same functionality, as shown in 
Figure 5.10, Figure 5.11, and Figure 5.12. 
The security requirements for the Check Inventory and Update Inventory encompass the 
claim-based scenario and involve the intervention of a Security Token Service, as 
described in Section 4.3.1. The Prepare Order and PDF Resource scenario refer to the 
mixed security implementations. The modeling elements affected by the mixed security 
scenario share the characteristic that they cannot be accessed or manipulated in a 
technology-neutral manner. The last Place Order scenario refers to the role/identity-based 
security implementation and builds upon the username credentials and according roles.    
5. Security Model Concept and Specification 
70 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Security Requirements for Prepare Order and PDF Resource 
 
 
Figure 5.12: Security Requirements for Place Order 
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6 Design and Implementation 
This chapter introduces a prototypical implementation that is meant to be a proof of 
concept of the previously discussed and elaborated concepts, cf. the workflow model in 
Chapter 4, the general access control model in Chapter 4.3, and finally the security model 
presented in Chapter 5.  
The chapter begins with a brief overview of the prototype. After the general overview the 
architecture of the underlying model is presented. This should provide the basis to the 
reader for understanding the implementation details presented in the next part. The 
implementation section covers the technologies that we have used and what kind of 
according security mechanisms were considered to develop the prototype.   
6.1 Secure Workflow Designer Prototype 
The prototype, named Secure Workflow Designer, is the result of the elaboration with the 
goal to provide an intuitive graphical modeling environment with integrated security based 
on the proposed concepts of the previous chapters.  
As shown in Figure 6.1, the program user interface consists of following components: 
1. Activities Pane. The activities pane consists of modeling elements that can be 
added by a drag-and-drop operation to the workspace. The modeling elements are 
organized into following categories: agents, operations, resources, and security 
controls. 
2. Designer Workspace Pane. The designer workspace pane is an area where to 
modeling elements can be placed.  
3. Source Code Pane. The source code pane shows the source code of the designed 
workflow model. 
4. Properties Pane. The property pane shows all available properties for the selected 
modeling element. 
5. Agents Category. The agents’ category consists of an agent lane element presented 
in Section 4.2.1. 
6. Operations Category. The operations category consists of operations based on the 
model presented in Section 4.2.3. 
7. Resources Category. The resources category consists of resources based on the 
model presented in Section 4.2.4. 
8. Security Controls Category. The security controls category consists of modeling 
elements that represent the security goals presented in Section 5.3. 
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9. Basic Category. The basic category consists of some basic modeling elements that 
allow defining some of typical flow constructs as described in Section 3.3.2. 
10. Workflow Model. The model represents the composition of the modeling elements. 
The composed model is based on the conceptual workflow model presented in 
Section 4.2. 
11. Variables/Arguments Bar. This bar allows defining in/out arguments and local 
variables of the designed model.  
 
Figure 6.1: Validating Prototype 
6.2 Development Environment 
The Secure Workflow Designer prototype was built using the following technologies: 
• .NET Framework v.4.0 (especially Windows Workflow Foundation and Windows 
Communication Foundation frameworks) 
• SQL Server 2008 Express Edition 
• Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 
Additionally, following libraries and frameworks has been partly used: 
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• Windows Identity Foundation SDK v.4.0 (for the claim-based security) 
• iTextSharp v.5.0.6 (for the PDF documents related security) 
• User Interface Design Framework12
As authors in (Zapletal, van der Aalst, Russell, Liegl, & Werthner, 2009) state, Windows 
Workflow Foundation (WF) provides a greater expressiveness, in terms of workflow 
patterns, than BPEL or jBPM. Further, the advantage of being an integral part of the .NET 
Framework allows WF a smooth and highly customizable incorporation in any type of 
.NET applications and technologies. For this reason, WF v.4.0 as part of the Microsoft 
.NET Framework v.4.0.3031 was used as the starting point for the implementation. As 
described in Section 
 (graphic icons) 
3.3.3, WF provides a flexible and powerful framework for developing 
workflow enabled applications. Based on this framework the prototype was developed in 
Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 used as Integrated Development Environment (IDE), and in 
C# as the programming language.  
The Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) v.4.0 was used for creating, hosting, 
and consuming of services. WCF is the technology for developing service-oriented 
applications, and is along WF, Windows Presentation Foundation (WPF), and ADO.NET 
an integral part of the .NET Framework v.4.0.x. The view of prototype was developed 
using the WPF framework and its Extensible Application Markup Language (XAML) 
language for specifying the visual aspects of the prototype. The implementation of PDF 
related security was done with the iTextSharp v.5.0.6 library. The iTextSharp library 
provides a comprehensive support for creating and manipulating PDF resources. The 
library is available under the GNU Affero General Public License v.3 and provides a C# 
port, which makes it reasonable candidate for our implementation. The database layer of 
the retailer scenario, presented in Section 5.5, was realized with SQL Server 2008 Express 
Edition and Entity Framework (EF). Entity Framework as part of ADO.NET v.4.0 is an 
API for using an object model to communicate with relational databases. Finally, the 
Windows Identity Foundation (WIF) was used for communicating with the STS of the 
retailer scenario. WIF is a Software Development Kit (SDK) shipped by Microsoft for 
claim-based identity in applications. 
6.3 General Architecture 
As shown in Figure 6.2 the workflow model instance is the central hub for several 
components of implemented architecture. 
                                                 
12 This framework is free for every use, even for commercial project, and available under this page: 
http://www.webalys.com/design-interface-application-framework.php.  
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The Secure Workflow Client component represents the visual and the controller part of the 
Model-View-Controller (MVC) architectural pattern  (Krasner & Pope, 1988). The UI of 
the application is defined via XML markup in XAML. This markup is used to connect to 
the control and the message UI handlers of the view. Each part of the UI, as well as the 
modeled elements (e.g. operations, resources, security controls) in the workspace, has its 
own representation in XAML. The client controller aggregates the information and 
implements a publish/subscribe mechanism for events in the workflow model. 
 
Figure 6.2: General Prototype Architecture13
The Workflow Host component hosts the workflow engine and communicates with the 
client. Further, it implements some infrastructure services, such as the audit functionality, 
which is based on a special extension mechanism in the workflow engine component. 
Finally, the Workflow Host is responsible for dynamic loading of missing assemblies such 
as classes of the WIF or iTextSharp libraries, which are not part of the Client Profile in the 
.NET Framework. 
 
                                                 
13 For reasons of clarity, the term workflow is abbreviated as WF. 
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The Workflow Engine is responsible for scheduling and executing the activities of the 
generated workflow model instance. To deploy a workflow instance, the whole workflow 
model tree must be previously serialized into XAML code with a special class called 
ActivityXamlServices. This class creates an instance of the model tree in XAML and makes 
it available for persistence or loading into the workflow engine. 
 
Figure 6.3: External Services 
The External Services component is intended for communicating with external web 
services and mixed security implementations. As shown in Figure 6.3 the communication 
can be divided into three main categories:  
• Claim-Based Security. The claim-based security is based on the security token 
based authentication presented in Section 4.3.1 and claim-based authorization 
presented in Section 4.3.2.  
• Role/Identity-Based Security. The role/identity-based security is based on the 
UserName and security token authentication presented in Section 4.3.1 and role-
based authorization presented in Section 4.3.2. As the motivating example involves 
the indirect communication to the rating agency service, this category 
impersonation related implementation presented in Section 4.3.3.  
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• Mixed Security Implementation. This category consists of legacy implementations 
or components that cannot be accessed in technology-neutral manner. In our 
example it is the mail gateway that requires custom credentials and the PDF library 
for signing and encrypting the PDF resources. 
The Workflow Components Library consists of elements that encapsulate the behavior of 
the security goals presented in Section 5.3. Further, the component defines a custom 
activities library that provides the logic for all related modeling elements in the workflow 
designer client, such as agents, operations and resources defined in Section 4.2.   
To extend the Secure Workflow Designer architecture (e.g. by implementing new types of 
security controls or operations), the given logic must be encapsulated in a class that derives 
from the Activity class, as described in Section 6.4.2. To make it available in the UI, the 
new component must be registered in getActivitiesToInclude() and 
LoadToolboxItemWrapper() methods in the ToolboxUtil class.   
6.4 Prototype Implementation 
The Secure Workflow Designer prototype was implemented in several stages. The entire 
implementation may be summarized as follows: 
• Re-hosting of the designer and the workflow engine; 
• Implementation of workflow-related logic and workflow modeling elements; 
• Implementation of the scenario-based infrastructure (e.g. host and backend 
services); 
• Implementation of the security related infrastructure (e.g. the security token 
service) and logic (e.g. security enforcing logic of the security controls). 
6.4.1 Re-hosting Functionality 
To enable the use of the workflow engine and deployment of the implemented modeling 
elements as part of the workflow tree, a significant effort was made by exploring the 
System.Activities.Presentation.Metadata and System.Activity.Presentation.Model 
namespaces in the .NET Framework. These packages contain many important classes for 
associating the visual parts with the underlying model implementations. These classes are 
extensively used for the native modeling in Visual Studio. However, these packages can be 
also reused in a stand-alone application. This allows implementing a customized designer 
canvas that can be associated with the underlying workflow runtime. 
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 After implementing the UI of the main application window, the first step was to create an 
instance to the WorkflowDesigner class, and then to reference several UI parts to the 
designer visual components. In the next step we created an instance of the workflow 
engine and registered the in-memory representations of the visual shapes. Then, a custom 
method that loops through the available modeling elements was responsible for adding 
references to the Activities Pane. 
The execution of the visualized model is basically done by flushing and loading the visual 
model to an instance of the StringReader class, then passing the reference to the 
ActivityXamlServices, and finally creating a single instance of the workflow runtime by 
calling the execution method of the WorkflowApplication class. 
6.4.2 Workflow-related Functionality 
A WF model is organized in custom units of work that can represent a discrete step (e.g. 
operation or control flow), a resource (e.g. a security goal14 5.3 defined in Section  or a 
workflow resource defined in Section 4.2.4), or any further custom implementation as long 
as its parent class is, or derives from the Activity class in the System.Activities namespace 
of the .NET Framework. These custom units of work are called activities15
 
 (Microsoft, 
2011) and can be nested in various ways. The resulting hierarchical tree of activities is 
what we call a workflow model. 
Figure 6.4: Categories of the Custom Categories 
As shown in Figure 6.4, our prototype implements several individual activities that can be 
organized in five categories: Operations, Resources, Agents, Security Controls, and Flow 
category.  
As our main focus is on security related implementation, we shortly present the 
functionality and implementation of an activity on the example of the AgentLane, 
introduced in Section 4.2.1.  
                                                 
14 The internal representation of security goals is stored in data variables. 
15This term is in contrast with what we defined in Section 4.2, where an activity is specified as a combination 
of an agent, an operation, and a piece of resources. As our prototype builds upon the Workflow Foundation, 
we use the framework specific terminology in this section. 
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As indicated in Figure 6.5, the AgentLane implementation follows the MVC pattern and 
consists of three parts: 
• View. The view consists of two drag-and-drop WPF view controls. These view 
controls allow the user to add agent security controls and related operations, as 
shown in Figure 5.3. 
• Controller. The controller validates the input and passes it to the model. 
• Model. The model consists of several blocks, each responsible for a particular task 
in the workflow. The In/Out Arguments are declarations of the Arguments class in 
the System.Activity namespace and are responsible for passing data to and out of the 
activity. The assignment to these arguments can be done in code or in the 
Variables/Arguments Bar of UI. The next Child Activities block represents the 
internal storage container for the agent security controls and related operations. 
Each of these child activities maintains its own state and is scheduled in the 
Execute Block. The WF runtime makes a clear distinction between built-time and 
run-time as described in Section 3.3. Prior the actual execution of the activity, the 
WF creates an instance of the ActivityMetadata class in the CacheMetadata block. 
This metadata instance is used to validate the relationships and dependencies of the 
activity. In our case, we may detect the type of the available security controls or 
even add some new implicit security controls as described in Section 5.1. 
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Figure 6.5: Components of the AgentLane Activity  
The elaborated design facilitates the implementation of the context-based security. Our 
realizing algorithm basically consists of two parts: the visual part and the logical part. The 
visual part is done, by overriding the CacheMetadata method.  The metadata instance of 
the NativeActivityMetadata class is used to add visual errors and warnings, depending on 
data in in/out arguments or internal data (e.g. security controls). Then, by using the manual 
configuring methods of the metadata instance, we schedule the custom activities that are 
not automatically detected by the reflection mechanism. 
The second part implements the run-time related logic by overriding the Execute() method 
of the Activity class. Besides the scheduling of the activities for the execution, we may 
detect the available security controls by creating an instance of the data context of the 
current workflow environment. The instance contains the manual model property 
descriptors that we can navigate for the previously added data, e.g. authentication context 
or a custom signature.  
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6.4.3 Auditing Security Requirement 
WF provides a built-in mechanism for tracking workflow runtime data. The described 
tracking architecture is based on (Microsoft, 2011) and (Bukovics, 2010). 
 
Figure 6.6: Workflow Tracking in WF (Bukovics, 2010) 
The tracking mechanism is realized using the publish/subscribe pattern. The published data 
is organized in tracking records, as shown in Figure 6.6: Workflow Tracking in WF 
(Bukovics, 2010). Each tracking record is a raw piece of data that can be consumed by a 
tracking participant. To filter the tracking profiles each tracking participant may implement 
a tracking profile. A tracking profile consists of tracking query objects that derive from the 
TrackingQuery class and define the target queries against the different types of 
TrackingRecord classes. Our prototype implements the auditing security requirement by 
adding the previously discussed mechanism via the extension property of the workflow 
engine.  
6.4.4 Infrastructure-related Functionality 
Based on the example of claim-based security, as shown previously in Figure 6.3, we 
describe the implementation of the infrastructure-related functionality. The WCF, as 
implementing technology, provides a comprehensive API for building secure, reliable, and 
interoperable services. Each service provides a set of endpoints that represent the sets of 
resources to which client messages can be sent.  
6. Design and Implementation 
82 
 
As shown in Figure 6.7, the specification of the communication and the enforcement of the 
security policies is done via channels and related binding configurations. Each operation 
(e.g. Check Inventory) has its own configuration set that is filled by the information (e.g. 
authentication security token) retrieved from the activities, classified in Figure 6.4.     
 
Figure 6.7: Channels and Bindings in WCF (Cibraro, Claeys, Cozzolino, & Grabner, 2010) 
The entire approach implementation for the claim-based scenario consists of the following 
steps: 
• Mapping of the relevant parts of the Retailer Database to the backend data model; 
• Implementation and configuration (e.g. authorization decisions) of the Retailer 
backend and frontend services; 
• Implementation and configuration of the Retailer Security Token Service;  
• Configuration of the Retailer frontend service and the related claim-based 
operations in the Secure Workflow Designer. 
The Retailer data model is realized by using the object relational mapping mechanism 
shipped with Entity Framework as part of the ADO.NET API.  The Figure 6.8 summarizes 
the data available in the Retailer scenario.  
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Figure 6.8: Mappings to the Retailer Database 
The generated data model classes are mapped to the physical database by using the 
connection string added to the App.Config file of the Retailer data model project. The 
Retailer backend service manipulates the generated data model by placing queries in 
Language Integrated Query (LINQ) against the newly created InteventoryEntities class.  
The System.ServiceModel and System.Runtime.Serialization namespaces provide 
functionality for defining services and their transmission. To identify data and service 
contract classes that should be exposed to the related WSDL documents, we annotate them 
with the following WCF-defined attributes: the [DataContract] and [DataMember] 
attributes define the data types available to the Retailer service, the [ServiceContract] 
attribute indicates the Retailer service interface and the [OperationContract] attributes the 
related operations. 
The implementation of the Security Token Service mainly consists of the 
SecurityWorkflowTokenService and SecurityWorkflowTokenHandler classes. The 
SecurityWorkflowTokenService overrides the GetScope() and GetOutputClaims() methods 
from the abstract SecurityTokenService class defined in WIF. The GetScope() takes the 
requestor’s identity as parameter and is responsible for validating and manipulating the 
incoming token issuance request. Besides the validation, we define the Retailer certificate 
(stored in the local certificate store) that should be used for encrypting the issued tokens. 
The GetOutputClaims() mainly contains the logic for claims that should be included into 
the issued token. Our prototype supports besides the predefined rules (e.g. that only 
managers and employees from the purchasing department are allowed to place purchase 
requests) a dynamic claims allocation retrieved from the UI. The 
SecurityWorkflowTokenHandler class interferes in the actual token processing by 
overriding the ValidateToken() method. Depending on the provided UserName credentials 
this method authenticates the issued security token and returns a set of authorizing policies 
in form of a ClaimsIdentityCollection.  
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The configuration of the Retailer frontend service is done, by defining the binding and 
behavior configuration in the App.config file. As our implementation is mainly based on 
open security standards, we widely reuse the binding elements of the WS2007HttpBinding 
and WS2007FederationBinding classes. These classes provide support for several security 
mechanisms discussed in Section 3.2.3. The most important sections concern the message 
security and the type of the accepted claims. The Retailer frontend service defines a claim-
based authentication contract that in turn represents a combination of the 
“http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name” and 
"http://SecureWorkflow/2011/02/Role" claim types. To be authenticated by the Retailer 
frontend each requesting token must include the defined claim types. Further, the 
requesting token must be issued by a trusted STS (Retailer STS). The whole scenario for 
the claim-based security is depicted in Figure 6.9: 
 
Figure 6.9: The Claim-Based Security Scenario 
1. To establish the authenticity and a shared security context between 
SecurityWorkflowDesigner and Inventory STS, the client sends a 
RequestSecurityToken (RST) message using the TLS Handshake Protocol for WS-
Trust (Alexander, et al., 2007) . This protocol defines a request response pattern for 
security token acquisition (for a secured communication channel) and defines 
exchanges for negotiation and challenges. After establishing the security context 
the proxy of the SecurityWorkflowDesigner sends a RequestSecurityToken using 
the UserName credentials (retrieved in our case from the AgentLane). 
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2. The STS Service receives the credentials and validates them against an active 
directory or any other custom store.  
3. After passing the validation process, the STS looks up the associated claims for the 
provided identity. The WIF significantly alleviates this step by providing a code 
representation of various well-known claim type schemas (Microsoft, 2011).  
4. If the claim mapping rules require additional information (e.g. the actual email 
address of the authenticated identity as value for the 
"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/emailaddress" claim) the 
STS may query for missing user attributes the Active Directory or any other custom 
store. 
5. After completing the claim mapping process, the STS sends a 
RequestSecurityTokenResponse (RSTR) message. This message contains an 
attached SAML token that includes a set of issued claims by the STS. 
6. Once the SecureWorkflowDesigner receives the SAML security token, it calls the 
Inventory Service by including the obtained token to WS-Security header of the 
requesting message. 
7. On each request the Inventory Service decrypts the SAML information (e.g. by 
using the public key of the issuing STS, if the SAML token was encrypted by the 
private key) and verifies that it can trust the included set of claims (e.g. by 
extracting the signature, expiration date, target audience etc.). 
8. Depending on the extracted claims the Inventory Service can make authorization 
decisions (e.g. if the provided role claim is not in the authorized group, the service 
can deny the request). 
9. Depending on the authorization decision the Inventory sends the requested 
information or a SOAP fault.   
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7 Summary and Future Work 
The main goal of this thesis was to provide a technology-independent framework for 
security visualization and enforcement in business process driven environments. The work 
was motivated by the observation that domain experts often need a profound knowledge of 
security relevant aspects to be able to model real-life scenarios. 
In the first part we presented a motivating use case typically found in supply chains. Based 
on this example we deduced the technical implications, which in turn significantly shaped 
the problem statement covered in this thesis. 
As access control is one of the most fundamental mechanisms in any security solution, we 
began the second part with a detailed analysis of appropriate access control models and 
related constraints. Furthermore, we identified and reviewed previous works on modeling 
security in workflows. In the subsequent chapter we have continued our work by dealing 
with main concepts and technologies in workflow and security. Our analysis included the 
in-depth identification and discussion of competing workflow models, security goals, 
related security requirements, and implementing security mechanisms. 
Based on these results we began to develop our framework by identifying the business 
modeling constructs for a general workflow model. The elaborated workflow model was 
used as a basis for the security framework introduced in the subsequent chapter. The 
transition to the security framework was fulfilled by investigating in a general access 
control model that would facilitate the enforcement of authentication, authorization, 
impersonation in workflow related systems. To reflect the variety of business scenarios and 
related security mechanisms the presented security framework included several levels of 
abstraction. Each level was provided with detailed transitions matrices, allowing 
encompassing several workflow-related security mechanisms from the convenient visual 
modeling up to the actual enforcement and implementation.  
After elaborating the several layers of security, we discussed how the motivating example, 
introduced in the first part, can be applied to the unified security framework. Finally, the 
thesis was rounded by a synopsis of the architecture, design, and implementation details of 
the validating prototype. 
Since we mainly focused on security relevant aspects, future work can be continued in the 
following adjacent areas:  
Establishing of Trust. As (Bishup, 2009) points out, the proof of authenticity in distributed 
systems is often realized with a help of a trusted authority. In general, the trusted authority 
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is responsible for recognizing the requesting party as the claimed one. Thus, the 
establishing of a trustful communication between two or more parties highly depends on 
the trustworthiness of the issuing party. The recent news about compromising one of the 
root certificate authorities (Bright, 2011) circumstantiates the fundamental vulnerability of 
such systems. Based on some common trust perspectives reviewed in (Saunders, Wu, Li, & 
Weisfeld, 2004) it can be assumed that despite recent advances in technological 
infrastructure business environments will still have to rely on initial human interaction. We 
may assume that the establishing of trust would be easier in business process driven 
environments if it could be modeled as a part of the business process.   
Business rules and constraints. According to the Business Rules Group (The Business 
Rules Group, 2011) a business rule “is a statement that defines or constraints some aspect 
of the business. It is intended to assert business structure, or to control or influence the 
behavior of the business.” As many rule-based approaches in recent literature exist, we 
could imagine a unified view that combines the realized business rules engines (e.g. first-
order logic) with the security relevant aspects elaborated in context of this thesis.   
Compliance. Depending on the point of view it’s coming from, the security requirements 
may be seen as part of regulatory compliance laws and regulations. The Directive 
95/46/EC Directive (The European Parliament, 1995), also known as the EU Data 
Protection Directive and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002), 
especially the Section 404, that covers the topic of internal controls, can be seen as the 
most prominent examples in that area. As companies strive or as most cases are even 
obliged to fulfill an increasing number of standards and regulations, a unified view, 
especially on visualization of compliance control objectives and its enforcement, would be 
a significant step to decrease the burden of modeling business processes in compliance 
with applicable laws and regulations. 
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